Moral Education at Work: On the Scope of MacIntyre's Concept of a Practice

Matthew Sinnicks

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    15 Citations (Scopus)
    19 Downloads (Pure)

    Abstract

    This paper seeks to show how MacIntyre’s concept of a practice can survive a series of ‘scope problems’ which threaten to render the concept inapplicable to business ethics. I begin by outlining MacIntyre’s concept of a practice before arguing that, despite an asymmetry between productive and non-productive practices, the elasticity of the concept of a practice allows us to accommodate productive and profitable activities. This elasticity of practices allows us to sidestep the problem of adjudicating between practitioners and non-practitioners as well as the problem of generic activities. I conclude by suggesting that the contemporary tendency to regard work as an object of consumption, rather than undermining MacIntyre’s account of practices, serves to demonstrate the potential breadth of its applicability.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)105-118
    JournalJournal of Business Ethics
    Volume159
    Issue number1
    Early online date1 Dec 2017
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Sept 2019

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